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The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  clarify  a  feature-oriented  assessment  of 
psychological  contracts,  an  underdeveloped  approach  to  psychological 
contracts. From a theoretical perspective, the study aims to conceptualize the 
nature  or  different  dimensions  of  a  psychological  contract  drawing  upon 
theoretical frameworks and cross-national research. Reviewing the 13  nation-
studies of psychological contracts organized by Rousseau and Schalk (2000), we 
find  support for  the  relevance  of  four  theoretical  dimensions:  time  frame, 
tangibility,  scope  and  stability,  as  well  as  indications  f-or  two  additional 
dimensions:  power  distance  and  individualization.  From  an  empirical 
perspective, the 6 conceptualized dimensions are being operationalized in terms 
of employees' expected entitlements as well as their expected obligations and 
tested in a  large, representative sample of 1,106  employees across industries, 
organizations  and  legal  contracts.  The  analyses  resulted  in  12  scales  and 
indicated  that the  expected  entitlements  and obligations  of scope,  stability, 
power distance and individualization do not highly correlate with each other 
while high correlations between entitlements and obligations of time frame and 
tangibility exist. 
1 Introduction 
After a hiatus of more than two decades, empirical assessments of psychological 
contracts  reappeared  in  organizational  research  (Rousseau  and  Tijoriwala, 
1998). In contrast to the initial research (Argyris, 1962; Levinson, Price, Munden, 
Mandl and Solley, 1962),  this new stream of  studies focuses  on quantitative 
assessments (e.g. Rousseau, 1990; Robinson, Kraatz and Rousseau, 1994; Guzzo, 
Noonan and Elron, 1994; Freese and Schalk, 1996; Herriot, Manning and Kidd, 
1997).  While  these  new  studies  have  generated  valuable  insights  into  the 
content  and  dynamics  of  psychological  contracts,  they  have  approached 
psychological  contracts  with an almost  equal  number of  somewhat distinct 
assessments.  This  'embarrassing richness'  was  for  Rousseau  and  Tijoriwala 
(1998)  the starting point to review assessments used in psychological contract 
research and to propose an organizing framework for future research. Rousseau 
and Tijoriwala (1998) distinguish three forms of measurement: content-oriented 
- examining the specific terms of the contract; feature-oriented - comparing the 
contract to some attribute or dimension; and evaluation-oriented - assessing the 
degree of fulfillment, change or violation experienced within the context of the 
contract.  While  content-oriented  and  evaluation-oriented  measurements  are 
well-known  approaches  to  understand  psychological  contracts,  feature 
measures are rather underdeveloped. 
It is  the  purpose of  this  study to  clarify  a  feature-oriented  approach to 
psychological  contracts and  to  increase  our understanding  of the nature of 
psychological  contracts.  A  feature-oriented  assessment  of  psychological 
contracts is 'to compare the contract to some attribute or dimension, such as the 
degree to which the contract is implicit/  explicit or stable/unstable over time ... 
Its features are adjectives  that characterize summary features  of the contract 
and  the  ways  in  which  it  was  conveyed  or  interpreted'  (Rousseau  and 
Tijoriwala,  1998;  p.  685).  While  the  potential  contribution  of  this  type  of 
assessment is its etic nature or the possibility to study psychological contracts 
across persons and settings (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998), only a few studies 
(McLean Parks, Kidder and Gallagher, 1998; McLean Parks and Van Dyne, 1995; 
2 Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993) have approached psychological contracts in 
a  feature-oriented  way.  While  the  little  existing  research  has  already 
distinguished several properties that differentiate contracts, most commonly: 
narrow  /wide scope;  explicit/implicit,  static/dynamic, certain/uncertain and 
written/unwritten (Rousseau and Tijoriwala,  1998),  major critics  (e.g.  Guest, 
1998)  state that the proposed dimensions have been derived more intuitively 
than theoretically, that the list of dimensions may be incomplete and that it is 
possible that not all dimensions are equally important or relevant. The objective 
of  this  study  is  to  further  develop  a  feature-oriented  assessment  of 
psychological contracts, both theoretically and empirically. From a theoretical 
perspective, this study aims to conceptualize the nature or different dimensions 
of  a  psychological contract drawing upon theoretical frameworks and cross-
national research.  Following the theoretical frameworks of Macneil (1985) and 
Rousseau  and  McLean  Parks  (1993),  we  examine  the  relevance  and 
completeness  of  five  dimensions  of  psychological  contracts  - time  frame, 
tangibility,  scope,  focus  and  stability  - from  a  cross-national  perspective. 
Reviewing  the  13  nation-studies2  of  psychological  contracts  (Rousseau  and 
Schalk, 2000), we find support for the relevance of time frame, tangibility, scope 
and  stability  as  well  as  indications  for  two  additional  dimensions:  power 
distance and individualization of contracts.  From an empirical perspective, the 
6 conceptualized dimensions are being operationalized in a consistent way and 
tested in a large, representative sample of 1,106 employees across industries, 
organizations  and  legal  contracts.  As  the  basis  for  our  feature-oriented 
assessment, we begin by defining the concept of psychological contracts. 
2 Australia, Belgium, France, Hong Kong, India, Israel, Japan, Mexico,  the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
3 Defining psychological contracts 
Because of the existing variety on the concept of psychological contract, we 
reviewed the different definitions of psychological contracts in order to identify 
the main points of discussion.  Throughout the literature, there seem to be two 
points  of  agreement:  psychological  contracts  are  subjective  and  reciprocal. 
Psychological contracts are subjective, in the sense that they refer to individual 
expectations,  perceptions  or beliefs.  Since  each  party  or  individual  selects, 
perceives  and interprets these  elements in his/her own way,  psychological 
contracts are subjective, unique and idiosyncratic - they exist 'in the eye of the 
beholder' (Rousseau, 1990, p. 391) or 'in the minds of the parties' (Herriot and 
Pemberton, 1995,  p. 17).  Psychological contracts are also reciprocal since they 
arise  in the context of an employment relationship  (e.g.  Herriot et  al.,  1996; 
McLean  Parks  et  al.,  1998;  Rousseau,  1990).  This  employment  relationship 
always  involves  two  parties,  implying  that  one  party  cannot  create  a 
psychological contract. 
More discussion exists about the implicit nature of psychological contracts. 
Schein (1965)  seems to suggest that all elements need to be implicit when he 
describes  the  psychological  contract  as  an  'unwritten  set  of  expectations'. 
Kotter (1973) on the other hand states that some elements of the psychological 
contract may be very clear  (explicitly present), while others may be unclear 
(implicitly  present).  Levinson  et  al.  (1962)  also  seems  to  drive  at  this 
interpretation when defining psychological contracts as a  product of mutual 
expectations, which are largely 'implicit and unspoken'. A critical perspective 
on this aspect is  taken by Guest (1998)  when asking whether a psychological 
contract  in  which  all  terms  are  explicit,  written  down  or  expressed, 
automatically ceases to be a 'psychological' contract. 
Similar differences in interpretation exist concerning the obligatory nature of 
the  psychological  contract.  According  to  Schein  (1965)  and  Dunahee  and 
Wangler  (1974),  the  psychological  contract  is  obligatory  because  of  the 
consequences  associated  with  non-compliance.  The  psychological  contract 
functions  in  the  same way as  a  legal  contract because the  consequences  of 
4 violations  can be  equally serious in both cases.  According  to  most  authors 
(Levinson et al.,  1962; Portwood and Miller, 1976;  Herriot et al.,  1996;  McLean 
Parks  et  al.,  1998)  however,  the  obligatory nature is  more the  result of  the 
reciprocal  character  of  the  contract.  Because  of  reciprocal  expectations  or 
perceived  obligations,  the  two  parties  are  bound  to  one  another.  Finally, 
according to Rousseau (1989), the obligatory nature ensues from the promises 
made,  which  she  believes  form  the  basis  of  psychological  contracts.  She 
therefore talks of a 'promissory contract'. 
In order to define the concept of psychological contracts, we have explicitly 
made a choice on the four above-mentioned aspects. Specifically, we consider a 
psychological contract as: 
•  subjective, referring to individual expectations or perceptions. This  implies 
that psychological contracts can be assessed by questioning one party in the 
exchange relationship. 
•  reciprocaL arising only in the interaction of two parties. This implies that the 
assessed expectations need to refer to the individual's expectations vis-a.-vis 
his/her present employer and not to general expectations about work. 
•  predominantly implicit. By focusing on the nature instead of the content we 
emphasize the implicit character of psychological contracts more than the 
explicit one. 
•  obligatory, indicating that it requires fulfillment because violation may have 
serious  consequences,  such  as  a  decline  in  performance  or  reduced 
involvement. 
An existing definition which fits these choices and which we adopt in this study 
is the one of McLean Parks and colleagues (1998,  p.  697):  'The psychological 
contract between an employer and  an employee is  the  idiosyncratic  set of 
reciprocal expectations held by employees concerning their obligations (what 
they will  do for  the  employer)  and their  entitlements  (what they expect to 
receive in return).' 
5 Conceptualizing the nature of psychological contracts 
To address the concern of theoretical foundation, we start our conceptualization 
of  features  of  psychological  contracts  with  the  theoretical  framework  of 
Rousseau and McLean Parks (1993).  They distinguish 5 underlying dimensions 
of  psychological  contracts  which  are  based  on  the  'contractual  continuum' 
proposed by Macneil (1985):  time frame, tangibility, scope, focus and stability. 
In this study, we exclude the dimension of 'focus' because this facet of contracts 
refers  to  elements  of  a  contract  and  thus  represents  a  content-oriented 
assessment.  Specific, focus indicates the degree to which the employee stresses 
socia-emotional aspects such as appreciation, friendship, respect, opportunities 
for personal growth and development versus economic aspects, such as wages, 
benefits and bonuses (McLean Parks et  aI.,  1998).  It is  mainly the economic 
aspects, such as wages, benefits and bonuses, that are content-oriented aspects 
of psychological contracts.  We now briefly discuss the theoretical meanings of 
the 4 remaining dimensions and assess  their relevance by relying on cross-
national  research  on psychological  contracts in 13  countries  (Rousseau  and 
Schalk,  2000).  We  further  examine  the  extent  to  which  this  international 
research on psychological contracts  indicates the existence of other relevant 
dimensions.  Comparing the different portrayals, two additional dimensions 
were identified: power distance and individualization. 
Time frame of psychological contracts: long term - short term 
The dimension of time frame has its origins in the distinction between short-
term contracts and long-term contracts (Macneil, 1985).  Rousseau and McLean 
Parks (1993)  define time frame as the perceived duration of the employment 
relationship.  While time frame is regarded here as a feature of psychological 
contracts, Rousseau later argues that time frame, like focus, resembles content-
oriented assessment (Rousseau and Tijoriwala, 1998). We would argue however 
that time frame  is  an essential characteristic of an employment relationship. 
This dimension is considered a crucial criterion in distinguishing several types 
of  employment  relationships,  such  as  a  relational  or  transactional  contract 
(Rousseau, 1995), a clan or market relationship (Beer, Spector, Lawrence, Mills 
6 and Walton, 1984), or a make or buy relationship (Williamson, 1981). It is  for 
this  reason  that  we  include  time  frame  as  a  dimension  of  psychological 
contracts.  In accordance with the purpose of our study, we operationalize this 
dimension in terms of the nature of the relationship and not in content-terms. 
The relevance of this dimension is strongly supported by the cross-national 
research on psychological contracts. The dimension of time frame seems to be 
an important property associated with contracts and employment relationships, 
mainly described in content-terms with job security and loyalty as the central 
concepts.  For example, job security in return for loyalty is still the standard in 
shaping  the  employment  relationship  in  Belgium  (Sels,  Janssens,  Van  den 
Brande and Overlaet, 2000)  and France (Cadin, 2000).  Indicators of this long-
term  perspective  can  be  found  in  the  legal  character  of  the  employment 
relationships (e.g. a limited use of temporary contracts, long notice periods), in 
HRM  practices  (e.g.  closed  internal  labor  markets,  promotion  based  on 
seniority)  and in employees' behavior (e.g.  little external mobility, long-term 
commitment). The USA and Singapore are countries at the opposite end of the 
dimension.  The principle of 'employment at will,' job mobility and the limited 
number of employees having an open-ended contract are indicators of a short 
term  perspective  in  the  USA  (Rousseau,  2000).  In  the  case  of  Singapore, 
employees aim not so much for job security, but for  greater employability and 
the  development of a  'protean' or 'boundary-less career' (Ang, Tan and Ng, 
2000). 
Tangibility of psychological contracts: specified - ambiguous 
Tangibility,  the  second  dimension,  originates  from  the  distinction  between 
tangible  contracts  and  intangible  contracts  (Macneil,  1985).  Drawing upon 
Rousseau  and McLean Parks  (1993),  tangibility is  defined as  'the degree  to 
which  the  employee perceives  the  terms  of  the  contract as  unambiguously 
defined  and  explicitly  specified  and  clearly  observable  for  third  parties' 
(McLean Parks et al., 1998, p. 708). 
The  cross-national  comparison  of  psychological  contracts  shows  that 
tangibility  is  an  important  dimension  in  all  countries  for  characterizing 
7 employment relationships. The concepts used refer to clarity and transparency 
versus  ambiguity and room for  interpretation. High tangibility seems to  be 
particularly  important  in Western  European  countries  as  indicated  by  the 
existence  of a  complex  web  of formal  laws and regulations and numerous 
written labor agreements. The Dutch case is here exemplary (Freese and Schalk, 
2000).  In the  US,  HRM practices  form  the  functional  equivalent of written 
employment agreements. Transparency and tangibility are established through 
specific  job  descriptions,  explicit  performance  requirements,  unambiguous 
evaluation  and  reward  criteria  and  regular  feedback  (Rousseau,  2000).  In 
contrast,  Asian  countries  are  rather  typified  by  an  intangible  nature  of 
employment relationships. For instance, trust seems to carry more weight than 
the formalization of rights and obligations in Hong Kong (Lee,  Tinsley and 
Chen,  2000)  and India (Shah,  2000),  and broad role  definitions  seem to be 
dominant in Singapore (Ang et  al.,  2000).  Finally,  several countries seem to 
know  an  evolution  towards  making  the  employment  relationship  more 
tangible. In Mexico, for example, a clear trend from verbal agreements towards 
written,  detailed  employment  contracts  can  be  observed  (Diaz-Saenz  and 
Witherspoon, 2000). 
Scope of psychological contracts: narrow - broad 
Macneil (1985) distinguished contracts with a narrow scope from contracts with 
a broad scope. According to  the definition of McLean Parks and colleagues 
(1998, p. 707), scope refers to 'the extent to which the boundary between one's 
employment relationship and other aspects of one's life is seen as permeable.' 
Examining the 13 nations-study, scope emerges as a relevant dimension for 
typifying  psychological  contracts.  In  most  Western  countries,  employment 
relationships display a rather narrow scope. Indicators are the strict division 
between work and personal life  (Belgium;  Sels  et  al.,  2000)  and the limited 
interference of organizations in the lives of their employees (The Netherlands; 
Freese and Schalk, 2000). Furthermore, the employment relationship is mainly 
interpreted  as  an economic  and much less  as  a  socio-emotional  reciprocal 
relationship (USA;  Rousseau, 2000).  Considering the employees' perspectives, 
8 they see their jobs as a means of achieving an end (UK; Millward and Herriot, 
2000),  demonstrate little extra-role  behavior (Australia; Kabanoff, Jimmieson 
and Lewis, 2000) and are relatively uninvolved with their jobs (New Zealand; 
Peel  and  Inkson, 2000).  Nonetheless,  in various Western  cases,  reference  is 
being made to  an expansion of scope.  For instance, in the Netherlands, the 
division between work and personal life is becoming more permeable through 
overtime work, working at home, flexible  hours, and parties with colleagues 
(Freese  and Schalk,  2000).  A  broader  scope of employment relationships  is 
being found in countries such as Israel (Krausz, 2000) and Mexico (Diaz-Saenz 
and Witherspoon, 2000). It is expressed through the employers' concern for the 
employees' family situation (parental leave, flexible hours, possibility of staying 
at home when children are  ill,  sponsoring recreation parks or socio":cultural 
centers).  However, employment relationships are particularly broad in Asian 
countries. Extra-role behavior is regarded as evident in Japan (Morishima, 2000) 
and Singapore (Ang et al., 2000), being reinforced by a corporate culture of open 
communication, support, respect, appreciation and trust.  A broad scope is also 
found  in  Indian  family  businesses  where  it  is  expressed  in  far-reaching 
sacrifices  in favor  of the employer  (e.g.  wage cuts during a  recession)  and 
reinforced by frequent recruitment among families and friends (Shah, 2000). 
Stability of psychological contracts: static - evolving 
Stability, the fourth and last dimension of psychological contracts derived from 
Macneil's contract theory, refers to static versus evolving or dynamic contracts 
(Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993).  Stability of a  psychological contract is 
defined as 'the degree to which the psychological contract is limited in terms of 
its ability to evolve and change without an implied renegotiation of the terms' 
(McLean Parks et al., 1998, p. 706). 
Following the cross-national study, indicators of stability often refer to a strict 
application of rules and arrangements by employers and a  rather inflexible 
attitude  towards  internal  changes  by  employees.  Dynamic  employment 
relationships can be  found  in USA  with a  high level of tolerance regarding 
change and uncertainty (Rousseau, 2000).  Also Asian countries like Japan know 
9 this nature of psychological contracts through flexible application of rules and 
continuously  reinterpretation  of  details  of  the  employment  relationships 
(Morishima,  2000).  In  contrast,  Australia  is  a  prominent example  of static 
employment relationships with the strict application of rules, very few HRM 
practices that can increase flexibility  and a low tolerance level to  uncertainty 
(Kabanoff  et  al.,  2000).  In  countries  such  as  Belgium,  France  and  the 
Netherlands, the situation is fairly ambiguous. Great importance is attached to 
carefully designed rules and legislation. However, in practice, these rules are 
flexibly applied. For instance, the web of rules in France apparently creates so 
much uncertainty and confusion that these rules are being flexibly interpreted 
depending on the context (Cadin, 2000). 
Power distance of psychological contracts: low -high 
Reviewing  the  different  portrayals  of  psychological  contracts  in  different 
countries,  we  identified  two  other  dimensions  necessary  for  a  full 
understanding of all possible features associated with psychological contracts: 
power distance and individualization. The term power distance was originally 
used  by  Mulder  (1971,  1977)  to  describe  social  relationships,  structures  or 
systems and is currently a very well known cultural dimension in cross-cultural 
research (e.g. Hofstede, 1980). Power distance is defined by Mulder (1977, p. 90) 
as 'the degree of inequality in power between a less powerful individual and a 
more powerful other, or the potential to determine or direct (to a certain extent) 
the behavior of another  person/  other persons more so than the other way 
round.' 
The cross-national study on psychological contracts (see  Table  1)  suggests 
that this dimension is mainly illustrated through concepts such as hierarchy and 
inequali  ty. 
10 Table 1.  Power distance dimension of psychological contracts. 
Country  Concepts and practices 
Australia  Tradition of egalitarianism 
Distrust of authority 
Minimization of privileges 
Belgium  Differences in hierarchical position correspond to differences of status 
Respect for authority, orders and control 
Subordinates recognize authority and are prepared to do as they are told 
France  Honor is pride in one's own rank and fear of losing it 
Social status and professional position are closely connected 
Subordinates dislike supervision and do not feel obliged to follow the 
injunctions of the boss 
During crissituations, the boss is supposed to make all decisions 
Hong Kong  Hierarchy 
Paternalistic management 
India  Caste system of mainly four social classes that are hierarchical 
A 'master-servant' type of relationship 
Attitudes of subservience and respect for authorities 
Hierarchical reporting structures, formalities 
Israel  Low power distance 
High informality 
Japan  Large status and pay differentials 
Mexico  Before 1986: 
Authoritarian and paternalistic treatment of workers 
No delegation of authority 
Lack of trust between employees and employers 
Top management rarely shares information with workers 
After 1986 (participation in the GATT, globalization): 
Flat organization structures with open communication 
Increased interaction and cooperation between management and unions 
The Netherlands  'Poldermodel' with negotiation, consensus policy making and culture of 
compromise as central elements 
Flat organization structures 
Informal behavior toward colleagues and bosses 
Open communication is highly valued 
Low level of respect for authority (e.g. scarcity of statues) 
New Zealand  Egalitarianism 
Personal contact - relationships tend to be friendly and informal 
Lack of deference and servility 
The manager as being competent, prudent in exercising authority, in 
general being a 'good bloke' 
Singapore  Job titles and job designations are extremely important, as they signify 
employees' career milestones and achievements. 
United Kingdom  Managerial control-budget targets - performance-related pay 
Little participation 
United States  Americans tend to view themselves as equals 
Parties to a contract are relatively equal 
Respect for achievement rather than for status 
11 Expectations concerning the degree of power distance can be shaped both by 
the employer and by the employee. Unequal treatment of employees through 
privileges  or  differential  status  treatment,  a  formal  relationship  between 
different  hierarchical  levels,  formal  ways  of  addressing  persons,  and  a 
paternalistic  management  style  are  all  employer  practices  which  create 
expectations  of  a  high power  distance  relationship.  The employee  can  also 
promote  a  high  power  distance  relationship  by accepting  the  authority  of 
hierarchy, adopting a conformist attitude and respecting orders. 
Individualization of psychological contracts: individual - collective 
The second dimension suggested by our review of the cross-national study on 
psychological contracts is individualization.  This dimension has already been 
suggested by Guest (1998) as a possible important dimension to understand the 
nature of psychological contracts. Individualization is expressed in the various 
countries  (see  Table  2)  by the  concepts  of an individually regulated versus 
collectively  regulated  employment  relationship.  An  individually  regulated 
employment relationship refers to the possibility of individual negotiation or, in 
other words, individual arrangements can be made which deviate  from  the 
norm. In contrast, in a collectively regulated employment relationship, little or 
no individual negotiation is possible because all employment aspects have been 
collectively  decided  on.  An individually regulated employment relationship 
may be further reinforced by individualized HRM practices such as individual 
performance-based  pay,  flexible  benefit  plans  or  individual  complaint 
procedures.  In contrast,  a  collectively  regulated employment relationship  is 
reinforced through the application of collective personnel practices, such as the 
use of generally applicable rules and procedures, agreements at group level and 
similar  treatment  of all  employees.  In a  collectively  regulated employment 
relationship,  trade  unions  often  play  a  more  prominent  role  than  in  an 
individually regulated employment relationship. The employee can also induce 
individualization into the employment relationship by demanding individual 
arrangements rather than relying on collective rules or on trade unions. 
12 Table 2.  Individualization dimension of psychological contracts 
Country  Concepts and practices 
Australia  Uniform general laws to enforce equal treatment 
Conception of equality: a minimum standard of material well-being for all 
Tradition of 'social justice': a 'fair go' for everyone 
Ethic of equality and mutual solidarity 
Belgium  Collective regulation of the employment relationship 
Little room for free negotiation of employment terms and conditions 
High trade union membership 
Compliance with social rules 
France  France celebrates 'equality' in all circumstances 
Duties and rights are designed collectively by the state 
Statutes restrict considerably individual workers' zones of negotiation 
Hong Kong  Reliance on mutual trust in establishing an employment relationship 
Obligations based on relationships mean more than written terms 
Personalism or the tendency to allow personal preferences and relationships 
to influence decision making and action 
India  Negotiation of employment contracts with unions, creating a collective or 
group-level agreement rather than a distinctive individual one 
Strong labor unions 
Equal treatment: same uniforms, same office space, same cafetaria 
Israel  Labor relations are mainly governed by collective bargaining 
Strong union system - sense of sharing and solidarity 
Equality as minimal reward differentials 
Japan  Importance of belonging, being a member of a larger entity 
Strong government regulations concerning labor markets 
Recent emphasis on individualized pay-for-performance 
Mexico  Importance of collective legal agreement and trade unions 
Principles of 'union' and 'solidarity' 
The Netherlands  Many contract features are covered by law or collective bargaining 
Broad zone of negotiability for young, highly educated workers. 
Minimization of inequality: striving for equal opportunities and results 
Specific human resource practices tend to become individualized 
New Zealand  Before 1984 (protected regulated welfare economy): 
Centralized, state-sponsored framework for contractual relationships 
Importance of trade unions 
After 1984 (unprotected deregulated market economy): 
Wider zones of contract negotiability - shift to individualized contracting 
Declining role of unions 
Decollectivization of resolution means - personal grievance procedures 
Singapore  'Personal achievement society' 
Individuals, not the state, have sole responsibility for personal success 
United Kingdom  Long tradition of collective bargaining, but the country's employment law 
has never strongly supported this tradition 
The regulatory framework is minimal compared to France or Germany 
United States  Few laws guaranteeing employment conditions 
Parties have a broad ability to negotiate the contract terms 
Individualized HR-practices: cafetaria plans, performance based rewards 
13 Summary 
Based on a theoretical framework (Rousseau and McLean Parks, 1993; McLean 
Park et al.,  1998) and a cross-national study on the meaning of psychological 
contracts (Rousseau and Schalk, 2000), we identified six relevant dimensions of 
psychological contracts: time frame, tangibility, scope, stability, power distance 
and  individualization.  We  will  now  operationalize  and  measure  these 
dimensions, conform with the definition of psychological contracts, in terms of 
expectations,  both  as  expected  entitlements  and  expected  obligations.  The 
testing of this feature-oriented assessment is carried out using a questionnaire 
answered by a large representative sample. 
Method 
Sample 
The  original  population  for  this  study  consisted  of  all  Belgian  employees 
working in private, public, profit and non-profit organizations with at least 10 
employees.  We excluded  agency workers, employees with 'small' part-time 
jobs  (less  than  40%  of  a  full-time  job),  seasonal  workers,  trainees  and 
apprentices.  A  (disproportionally)  stratified  random  sample  was  drawn, 
resulting in a  realized sample of 1.106  employees. The stratification variables 
chosen  were  gender,  age,  sector  of  employment  and  the  type  of  the 
employment  relationship.  The  latter  of  these  variables  was  included  for 
stratification since there is no single dominant type of employment relationship 
in Belgium (Sels et al., 2000). One important distinction is the difference between 
contract  and  statute,  as  two  different  mechanisms  of  formalizing  the 
employment relationship. In the private sector, the employment relationship is 
formalized  in an employment contract.  Employer and  employee have  the 
possibility of free negotiation with respect to the content of this contract.  In the 
public sector,  a  statute regulates the  relationship with the employer (i.e.  the 
government).  The  content of this  statute is  unilaterally established by the 
government-employer.  There is  no  question of  'autonomous expression  of 
will', such as in the contractual relationship.  A  second distinction still  very 
14 much present in the Belgian private sector is the difference between blue-collar 
workers, white-collar workers and executive level employees. The employment 
contract receives a very different content depending whether you belong to the 
first, the second or the third group. Labor law treats these categories differently 
for  issues  such  as  protection  from  dismissal,  salary  arrangements,  the 
probationary period, guaranteed income, annual vacation, etc.  Inclusion of this 
distinction in our survey design allows us to fully investigate the relevance of 
differences  in  'formal  contract'  for  the  nature  and  type  of  psychological 
contracts.  In order to  have sufficient data for  analyses we needed to select 
larger samples from the strata with smaller populations ('disproportional'), in 
casu from the'  executive level' stratum.  The realized sample includes 326 blue-
collar workers, 358 white-collar workers, 213 employees at executive level and 
209 civil servants (employed by 'statute'). 
The  data were collected using a standardized questionnaire.  Respondents 
were  interviewed by a  total  of 60  professional interviewers from  a  private 
research office.  All interviewers were very experienced in conducting face-to-
face interviews and received additional training from members of the research 
team.  In order to minimize the risk of interpretation errors, we organized a 
briefing on the content of the questionnaire for each individual interviewer. 
Measurement 
Conform the definition of psychological contracts, items were developed that 
measured the individuals' expectations concerning their entitlements (I expect 
from  my  employer  that  he ...  )  as  well  as  expectations  concerning  their 
obligations  (My  employer  can  expect  from  me  that ...  ).  Following  test 
interviews and a  pilot study, 61  items were retained. The respondents were 
asked to indicate for each item, on a five-point scale, to what extent they agreed 
with the item in question (1 = entirely agree; 5 = entirely disagree). 
Time frame refers to the expected duration of the relationship or the extent to 
which a  person expects a  short-term or long-term employment relationship. 
Seven items were developed to measure the individual's expected entitlements 
concerning a long-term commitment from his/her employer. Three items were 
15 designed to measure the individual's expected obligations indicating the degree 
to which the employer can expect a long-term commitment. 
Tangibility  refers  to  the  expected  specification  of  the  employment 
relationship  or  the  extent  to  which  a  person  expects  the  content  of  the 
employment  relationship  to  be  specified,  transparent  and  not  open  for 
interpretation.  Six items were developed to measure the individual's expected 
entitlements concerning written, unambiguous and detailed rights, obligations, 
and  agreements  of  the  employment  relationship.  The  individual's expected 
obligations  were  measured  by  four  items,  referring  to  specified  and 
unambiguous  communication  and  agreements  concerning  the  employee's 
wishes, intentions and plans. 
Scope refers to the expected scope of the employment relationship (narrow or 
broad) or the extent to which a person expects work and personal life to merge 
into one another. To  measure the individual's expected entitlements, 5 items 
were developed concerning the degree of personal treatment by the employer. 
The individual's expected obligations were measured by 5 items referring to 
his/her willingness to invest personally in the company. 
Stability refers to the expected stability of the employment relationship, or 
the extent to which a person expects no room for maneuver or flexibility to be 
possible  within  the  existing  employment  relationship.  The  individual's 
expected  entitlements  were  measured  by  5  items,  referring  to  the  strict 
application of  existing rules and arrangements. To  measure the individual's 
expected obligations, 5 items were developed indicating the degree to which 
the  individual  takes  an  inflexible  or  intolerant  attitude  towards  internal 
changes. 
Power distance refers to the expected power distance within the employment 
relationship (high or low) or the extent to which a person expects power to be 
unequally distributed between subordinates and superiors.  Five, resp. six items 
were  developed  to  assess  the  individual's  expected  entitlements  and 
obligations.  In  both  cases,  these  expectations  assess  the  degree  of  unequal 
treatment  between  subordinates  and  superiors,  the  extent  of  the  formal 
16 hierarchic relationship and autocratic or paternalistic management style. 
Individualization refers  to the expected degree of  individualization of the 
employment  relationship  or  the  extent  to  which  a  person  expects  the 
employment  relationship  to  be  individually or more  collectively  regulated. 
Seven items were developed to measure the individual's expected entitlements 
regarding  individual  or  collective  negotiation  and  individual  or  equal 
treatment. To measure the individual's expected obligations, 3 items referred to 
individual regulations or collective rules and procedures. 
Analyses 
Scales  were  formed  after  two  principal  component analyses  with varimax 
rotation to assess the dimensionality of the items. One analysis was conducted 
on the items measuring the employee's expected entitlements, and the second 
analysis on the items measuring the employer's expected  obligations.  Items 
with loadings  above  .40  and low  cross-loadings were  retained to  construct 
scales (Hair, Tatham and Anderson, 1995). Internal consistency of the scales was 
assessed by calculating the Cronbach alpha coefficient. 
Results 
Psychological contract dimensions: employees' expected entitlements 
Principal component analyses with varimax rotation on the 35 items measuring 
the  employee's  expected  entitlements  resulted  in  6  factors.  Following  the 
criteria  of  factor  loadings,  9  items  were  eliminated.  The  6-factor  structure 
explained 63.5% of the variance and indicated a stable structure: all items had a 
high factor loading on the factor for which they were intended (between .59 and 
.89) and no single item loaded for several factors (the highest cross-loading was 
.26). Table 3 presents the rotated factor loadings for the set of 26 items. 
17 Table 3.  Principal component analysis on expected entitlements 
Items  Factors 
I expect from my employer that he  Fl  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6 
offers me employment security  .17  .68  .11  .10  .16  .01 
makes a commitment to me for a long time  .17  .76  .07  .07  .09  .06 
offers me opportunities for career development  .09  .71  .03  .09  .18  .02 
doesn't immediately fire me if things are going badly  .08  .65  .26  .10  -.07  -.03 
offers me a transfer to another job if my current job  .13  .68  .08  .06  .00  .03 
would disappear 
does everything in his power to keep me employed  .12  .62  .26  .14  .24  .09 
sets agreements regarding my work down in writing  .73  .03  .05  .04  .11  .04 
makes specific agreements regarding my work  .75  .04  .11  .11  .11  .01 
is very clear about opportunities for advancement in this  .63  .25  .19  -.01  .14  .03 
firm 
specifically describes the performance appraisal criteria  .77  .16  .14  .03  .02  .01 
used in this firm 
unambiguously describes my obligations within this  .81  .18  .14  .12  .06  .05 
firms 
unambiguously describes my rights within this firm  .77  .21  .14  .14  .12  .01 
personally supports me in difficult periods  .19  .23  .59  .13  .26  .06 
appreciates me for what I do and for who I am  .20  .22  .72  .13  .14  .04 
considers not only the end result but also my personal  .20  .17  .70  .14  .17  -.01 
effort 
treats me as a person, not as a number  .10  .10  .81  .20  .06  -.02 
allows me to be myself within this firm  .10  .07  .75  .19  .15  -.04 
sticks to agreements despite changed circumstances  .24  .17  .21  .14  .65  -.03 
is flexible in applying agreements*  .07  .16  .26  .11  .69  .12 
considers made agreements as permanently valid  .17  .12  .15  .19  .78  .05 
gives differential benefits to superiors and subordinates  .04  .02  .03  -.08  -.01  .89 
allows managers in this firm to decide for their  .06  .09  -.03  .05  .12  .87 
subordinates 
treats all employees at the same level equally  .02  .12  .18  .79  .09  .01 
demands the same from all employees at the same level  .08  .11  .14  .86  .07  .03 
regards agreements as applicable to the whole group,  .12  .11  .21  .77  .15  -.07 
department or team 
applies the same benefits to all employees at the same  .14  .13  .16  .79  .14  -.02 
level 
Explained variance (%)  14.4  12.5  12  11.1  7.4  6.1 
* Item is reverse 
18 The first factor contains all six items, developed for the dimension of tangibility 
(ex  :=  .86)  and explains 14.4%  of the variance. These items assess the extent to 
which  the  employee  expects  rights,  obligations,  and  agreements  of  the 
employment relationship to be established in writing, clearly and concretely. 
We refer to this factor by the term tangibility expected by the employee. 
The  second  factor  contains all  seven items which refer  to  the employee's 
expectations of time frame  (ex  :=  .82)  and explains 12.5% of the variance. These 
items assess the extent to which the employee expects a long-term employment 
relationship,  resulting  in  a  scale  long-term  involvement  expected  by  the 
employee. 
Factor 3 contains all five items concerning the scope dimension (ex  := .84) and 
explains  12%  of  the  variance.  These  items  assess  the  extent  to  which  the 
employee expects the employer to treat him/her as a person, not purely as an 
economic  resource.  We  label  this  factor  personal  treatment  expected  by  the 
employee. 
Factor  4  contains  4  of  the  7  items  measuring  the  employee's  expected 
entitlements for the dimension individualization (ex:=  .85) and explains 11.1 % of 
the variance. All 4 items assess the extent to which the employee expects all 
workers to be treated equally by the employer. We therefore refer to this factor 
as equal treatment expected by the employee. 
The fifth factor contains 3 of the 5 items from the stability dimension (ex  :=  .70) 
and explains 7.4%  of the variance. Two items refer to  stability - the extent to 
which the employee expects the employer to hold on to the made agreements -
and one item refers to flexibility - the extent to which the employee expects a 
flexible  attitude  to  agreements.  Rather  than  stability  versus  flexibility,  the 
communality of this factor seems to lie in the attitude to agreements, which can 
be both stable and flexible.  We therefore interpret this factor as the carefulness 
regarding agreements expected by the employee. 
Finally, factor  6  contains  2  of the 5 items developed for  the dimension of 
power distance (r  :=  .58,  p<.OOl)  and explains 6.1%  of the variance. The two 
items assess the extent to which the employee expects unequal treatment across 
19 hierarchical  levels  and the use  of  an  autocratic management style.  For  this 
reason, we label this factor power distance expected by the employee. 
Psychological contract dimensions: employees' expected obligations 
Principal component analyses with varimax rotation on the 26 items measuring 
the individual's expected obligations resulted in 6 factors. Following the criteria 
of factor loadings, 3 items were eliminated. The 6-factor solution explained 66% 
of the variance. This factor structure also appeared very stable: all items had a 
high factor loading on the factor for which they were intended (between .66 and 
.89) and no single item loaded on several factors (the highest cross-loading was 
.32). Table 4 presents the rotated factor loadings for the set of 23 items. 
The first factor contains all five items from the scope dimension (a =  .85) and 
explains  14.2%  of  the  variance.  These  items assess  the  extent to  which  the 
employer can expect the individual to personally invest into the organization. 
This factor is labeled as personal investment that the employer can expect. 
The  second  factor  contains  all  five  items  developed  for  the  expected 
obligations concerning the stability dimension (a = .85)  and explains 13.8% of 
the variance. These items assess the extent to which the employer can expect 
from  the  employee  to  take a  flexible  and tolerant attitude towards  internal 
changes. We call this factor flexibility which the employer can expect. 
Factor  3  contains  all  four  items  developed  for  the  expected  obligations 
concerning  the  tangibility  dimension  (a  =  .79)  and  explains  11.4%  of  the 
variance. These items assess the extent to which the employer can expect from 
the employee to be specific about all  aspects of the employment relationship. 
We label this factor as open attitude that the employer can expect. 
Factor  4  contains  4  of  the  6  items  developed  for  the  power  distance 
dimension (a = .79)  and explains 11.1% of the variance. All 4 items assess the 
extent to which the employer can expect from the employee that authority will 
be respected.  This factor is labeled respect for authority that the employer can 
expect. 
20 Table 4.  Principal component analysis on expected obligations 
Items  Factors 
My employer can expect from me that I  F1  F2  F3  F4  F5  F6 
commit myself to this firm for a long time  .17  .11  .22  .12  .78  -.02 
accept a transfer to a different job in the organization  .00  .17  .06  .12  .76  -.01 
if  necessary 
stay with this firm my whole career  .08  .05  .16  .14  .83  -.01 
clearly state what is important to me in my work  .11  .12  .76  .12  .11  .07 
explicitly indicate my career wishes and plans  .14  .14  .73  .14  .16  .08 
clearly indicate if  problems arise  .08  .20  .75  .12  .10  -.01 
make explicit agreements with my boss about work  .12  .15  .67  .23  .10  -.01 
am concerned about this firm, even outside working  .82  .12  .01  .06  .12  .09 
hours 
work extra hours when necessary  .79  .11  -.06  .02  .04  .13 
bring own ideas and creativity into this firm  .78  .19  .21  .02  .02  .04 
want to develop myself in this firm  .71  .22  .28  .14  .14  .08 
invest time and energy in this firm  .70  .31  .22  .09  -.00  .03 
adjust easily to changes in my work situation*  .12  .74  .16  .14  .14  .07 
tolerate changes when introduced in this firm*  .13  .80  .09  .13  .01  .02 
deal with unpredictable events in rny work situation*  .21  .73  .18  .13  .06  .02 
adopt a flexible attitude*  .32  .67  .20  .18  .06  -.00 
accept if  agreements are being revised*  .18  .73  .11  .13  .08  .14 
show respect for my superiors  .17  .22  .23  .66  .06  -.03 
adopt a formal attitude to my superiors  .03  .11  .14  .78  .09  .06 
accept that management has a higher status than  .04  .11  .12  .76  .13  .10 
employees 
adhere to the authority of superiors  .05  .17  .12  .78  .12  .01 
have individual demands that are different than  .08  .03  -.01  -.06  -.02  .89 
those from other employees* 
want to make individual arrangements*  .14  .15  .11  .22  -.02  .79 
Explained variance (%)  14.2  13.8  11.4  11.1  9  6.5 
* Item is reverse 
21 The  fifth  factor  contains  all  three  items  developed  for  the  time  frame 
dimension  (ex  =  .76)  and explains 9%  of the variance. These items assess  the 
extent  to  which the  employer  can  expect  the  employee  to  be  loyal  to  the 
organization. We refer to this factor as loyalty that the employer can expect. 
Finally,  factor  6 contains  2 of  the  3  items which were developed for  the 
dimension  of  individualization  (r  =  .49,  p<.001)  and  explains  6.5%  of the 
variance. These 2 items assess the extent to which the employer can expect from 
the employee to ask for individual treatment. We refer to this factor by the term 
individualization that the employer can expect. 
Summary 
The operationalization of the 6 psychological contract dimensions in terms of 
expected entitlements and expected obligations resulted in 12  scales.  Table 5 
presents the correlation matrix between all 12 scales. The intrascale reliabilities 
are all higher than the interscale correlations, which suggests at least a tolerable 
level of discriminant validity for the 12 dimensions of psychological contracts 
(Buchanan,  1974).  The  results of  the correlation matrix further suggest that 
individuals  may  differ  in  their  perceptions  regarding  their  expected 
entitlements  and  expected  obligations.  The  difference  between  expected 
entitlements  and expected  obligations  seems to  be most prominent for  the 
dimensions  of individualization and  scope.  Individuals  who expect  a  high 
degree of equal treatment from their employer seem not to perceive it as their 
obligation to  make equal demands and requests of their employer (r=-.003). 
Similarly, individuals who expect a high degree of personal treatment seem not 
always to  perceive it as  their obligation  to show a  high degree of personal 
investment (r=.34).  The two scales referring to the dimension of stability are 
also correlated at a low level (r=.29) but this may be explained by the different 
meaning of the scale measuring the expected entitlements. This scale is labeled 
carefulness regarding agreements because it consists of items referring both to 
stability and flexibility. 
The  two  dimensions  having  high  correlations  between  the  expected 
entitlements  and  expected  obligations  are  time  frame  and  tangibility. 
22 Individuals  who  expect  long-term  conunitment  from  their  employers  also 
appear to be loyal to their employers (r=.71). Similarly, individuals who expect 
specificity from their employers also  seem to  demonstrate openness towards 
their employers (r=.54). In addition, the expected entitlements regarding scope 
appear to correlate highly with the expected obligations regarding tangibility. 
Individuals  who  expect  personal  treatment  from  their  employers  seem  to 
indicate that their employers can expect openness and clarity from them (r= 
.58). 
23 Table 5.  Means, standard deviations and intercorrelations among the 12 psychological contract dimensions. 
Mean  S.D.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12 
Long-term involvement  4.30  .65  1 
Tangibility  4.04  .68  .40**  1 
Personal treatment  4.46  .54  .45**  .42**  1 
Carefulness regarding  4.05  .67  .40**  .39**  .51**  1 
arrangements 
Power distance  3.01  1.04  .11**  .09*  .03  .14**  1 
Equal treatment  4.40  .65  .33*'  .26**  .44**  .40**  -.02  I 
Loyalty  4.20  .80  .71**  .28**  .32**  .29**  .12*'  26**  I 
Open attitude  4.35  .55  .41**  .54**  .58**  .41"  .10'  .37**  .38**  1 
Personal investment  3.78  .85  .16**  .13**  .34**  .21**  .25*'  .10'  .23*'  .34**  1 
Flexibility  4.16  .62  .25**  .20**  .35**  .29**  .30**  .28**  .29**  .44**  .48**  1 
Respect for authority  4.11  .65  .36**  .27**  .34**  .37**  .36**  .39**  .33**  .44**  .23**  .42'*  1 
Individualization  3.06  .97  .05  .12**  .16**  .23**  .31**  -.003  .02  .14**  .24**  .21**  .17**  1 
- ----
*p<.01  **p<.OOI Discussion and Conclusion 
The  purpose  of  this  study  was  to  clarify  a  feature-oriented  assessment  of 
psychological  contracts,  an  underdeveloped  approach  to  psychological 
contracts. It was designed in such a way that a number of hiatus in studying 
psychological contracts were being addressed.  First, the conceptualization of 
the different features or dimensions was based upon the theoretical framework 
of Rousseau and McLean Parks (1993)  who applied Macneil's contract theory 
(1985)  to  psychological contracts. In this way, we addressed a  major critique 
that dimensions of psychological contracts are often identified in an intuitive 
way. Second, we assessed the relevance and completeness of these theoretically 
derived  dimensions  by  relying  on  a  cross-national  study  of  psychological 
contracts  (Rousseau  and Schalk,  2000).  This  study provides  rich  and ernic 
descriptions of psychological contracts in 13 different countries that were used 
to  further  interpret the  existence  and importance of  psychological  contract 
dimensions.  It is  through  this  review  that  we  identified  two  additional 
dimensions: power distance and individualization. Third, we carefully crafted 
the  empirical  assessment  by  operationalizing  the  concept  of  psychological 
contracts in a  consistent way with the different aspects of its  definition and 
testing it in a large, representative sample. Fourth, we assessed the 6 different 
dimensions  in  terms  of employees'  expected  entitlements  as  well  as  their 
expected obligations.  Through differentiating each dimension into these two 
aspects,  we  explicitly  invoke  the  theoretical  element  that  psychological 
contracts exist  within  the  interaction  and exchange of  two  parties,  e.g.  the 
employee and his/her employer. The results further indicated that expected 
entitlements and obligations of a same psychological contract dimension do not 
necessarily have to correlate with each other while high correlations between 
entitlements and obligations of different psychological contract dimensions may 
exist. 
While the above discussion indicates the study'S contributions, the results 
also  show  its  limitations  and  indicate  questions  for  future  research.  One 
limitation  of  this  study  refers  to  the  operationalization  of  the  two  new 
25 psychological  contract  dimensions,  power  distance  and  individualization. 
While the cross-national study clearly indicates the existence of these aspects of 
the  employment  relationship,  no  reliable  scale  could  be  constructed  for 
employees'  expected  entitlements  concerning  power  distance  and  their 
expected obligations regarding individualization. The lack of reliability may be 
due to the invalid meaning that seems to occur when differentiating these two 
dimensions into entitlements and obligations.  Power distance  or respect  for 
authority  may  be  a  valid  aspect  in  the  employment  relationship  that  the 
employer  can  expect  from  their  employees  (obligation),  but  not  a  valid 
.  expectation  when  approaching  this  dimension  from  the  perspective  of  the 
employees  (entitlement).  The  reverse  may  be  true  for  the  dimension  of 
individualization. Employees can expect from their employer that an individual 
or  collective  treatment  is  being  adopted  (entitlement)  while  an  obligation 
towards the employer in terms of individualized versus collectivist behavior 
may be  more  difficult  to  imagine.  Another  limitation  of  this  study is  the 
exclusion of  'focus' as  an important dimension to understand the nature of 
psychological contracts. Our argument to  exclude 'focus' referred to  the fact 
that this facet of contracts refers to elements of a contract and thus represents a 
content-oriented  assessment.  Reflecting  on  our  purpose  of-ap]3I"0affiing 
psychological contracts in a  more comprehensive way, we acknowledge that 
'focus'  addresses a  very important aspect  of any employment relationship. 
Employees can engage in an employment relationship for both economic and 
socio-emotional reasons.  The challenge for  future research on psychological 
contract dimensions is  to  operationalize this aspect not in specific or discrete 
terms but as an underlying feature. 
Other reflections for future research refer to the inclusion of the employer's 
perspective  in  measuring  psychological  contract  dimensions  and  to  cross-
validate the different psychological dimensions in different cultural contexts. 
While  this  study addresses  the  reciprocal  aspect  of psychological  contracts 
through  differentiating  dimensions  into  entitlements  and  obligations,  it 
measures  the  two  sides  of  the  employment  relationships  only  from  the 
26 perspective  of  the  employee.  Future  research  including  the  employers' 
perspective  concerning  their  obligations  and  entitlements  vis-a-vis  their 
employees may lead to stimulating questions of how the two parties' expected 
obligations and entitlements in the exchange relationship covary or differ from 
each other.  Finally, future  research may benefit from assessing the different 
psychological contract dimensions in different cultural contexts.  Such research 
may lead to insights which dimensions seem to be truly etic concepts as well as 
how different or ernic practices concretize the etic dimensions of psychological 
contracts. 
Assessing the nature of psychological contracts by examining its underlying 
dimensions  offers  the  potential  to  study  employment  relationships  across 
persons  and  settings.  This  study  has  theoretically  identified  6  different 
psychological contract dimensions resulting in 10 reliable measures - 5 different 
dimensions  of employees' expected entitlements and 5  different  features  of 
expected obligations - which can be used in future research across different 
contexts. 
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